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Grimmett: NCAA Amateurism and Athletics

NCAA AMATEURISM AND ATHLETICS: A PERFECT
MARRIAGE OR A DYSFUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP?–AN
ANTITRUST APPROACH TO STUDENT-ATHLETE
COMPENSATION
Edward H. Grimmett
I.

INTRODUCTION

With the allegations surrounding Johnny Manziel, a National
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) Heisman Trophy winner,
the ongoing debate regarding student-athlete compensation is reaching new heights.1 Manziel allegedly received improper benefits in
exchange for his autograph and was suspended for the first half of
Texas A&M’s season opener for an “inadvertent violation of NCAA
rules.”2 Manziel’s notoriety and the nature of his alleged scandal acted as a spark in the debate over whether student-athletes should receive compensation. The NCAA and its member institutions generate billions of dollars through television revenue.3 Additionally, the
NCAA and its licensing affiliate, The Collegiate Licensing Company
(“CLC”), procure large profits through the licensing of the names and
images of student-athletes.4 Meanwhile, the products that the NCAA

J.D. Candidate, 2015, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. Sports Management, St. John’s University. I would first like to thank both my parents and my brother,
Joey, for their support throughout my life and all of the patience they displayed during my
work on this Comment. I would also like to thank my Faculty Advisor, Professor Rena
Seplowitz, for her insight and assistance on this topic. Lastly, I would like to thank Brandon
Maharajh and Jason Prince for their guidance on this Comment and the tremendous generosity they have demonstrated throughout law school.
1
Tom Fornelli, Johnny Manziel suspended for first half of Rice game, CBSSPORTS.COM
(Aug. 28, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-collegefootball/23366173/johnny-manziel-suspended-for-first-half-of-rice-game.
2
Id.
3
Pete Thamel, With Big Paydays at Stake, College Teams Scramble for a Spot, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/sports/ncaafootball/inconference-realignment-colleges-run-to-paydaylight.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
4
See Michael Smith, Collegiate licensing explodes in CLC’s 30 years, SPORTS BUS.
DAILY GLOBAL J. (Jun. 13, 2011), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011
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relies on, its student athletes, are only entitled to receive full-athletic
scholarships for their contribution to intercollegiate athletics.5
The NCAA, a non-profit organization, states in its bylaws that
its non-compensation policy is imperative to maintain amateurism in
collegiate athletics.6 However, this policy leads to improper practices
that require the NCAA to penalize its member institutions. One example is the sanctions that have been imposed on member schools for
providing benefits to student-athletes during the recruiting process.7
Recently, an investigation of a Miami booster, Nevin Shapiro, revealed that Shapiro provided improper benefits to at least seventytwo University of Miami student-athletes.8 Shapiro stated that he
gave money, cars, jewelry, and many other gifts to the athletes.9
Providing a uniform system of compensating athletes could deter improper inducements, which affect fair competition among member institutions.
Along with the billions of dollars that the NCAA receives for
its television broadcasts, a large part of its revenue is attributed to
collegiate licensing.10 The NCAA’s member institutions license their
collegiate jerseys to big-time apparel companies, such as Nike and
Under Armour.11 These companies are granted the rights to sell the
school’s jersey, which supposedly features a “random” number.12 Jay
Bilas, an ESPN college basketball analyst, made a shocking revelation that required the NCAA to take immediate action.13 Bilas revealed that these jerseys were searchable by player name, although

/06/13/Colleges/CLC-at-30.aspx (“[T]he collegiate licensing industry has become a $4.3 billion business in annual retail sales. About 60 percent of it comes from apparel sales.”).
5
Josh Levin, The Most Evil Thing About College Sports, SLATE (May 17, 2012, 7:50 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2012/05/ncaa_scholarship_rules_it_s_morall
y_indefensible_that_athletic_scholarships_can_be_yanked_after_one_year_for_any_reason_
.html.
6
JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: THE NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY 15 (2006).
7
Miami booster says improper benefits given to now-NFL players, NFL.COM (Aug. 16,
2011, 9:16 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d8218456f/article/miami-boostersays-improper-benefits-given-to-nownfl-players.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Smith, supra note 4.
11
Id.
12
Richard Deitsch, Jay Bilas Clowns the NCAA, NBC’s Premier League plans, more,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 11, 2013, 9:26 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/news/
20130811/jay-bilas-nbc-premier-league-deitsch/.
13
Id.
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no surname is present on the jersey.14 Therefore, searching “Johnny
Manziel jersey” directs users to Texas A&M’s website and displays a
jersey bearing his number.
Bilas’s discovery could provide an avenue for student-athletes
to receive compensation through the right of publicity. States have
enacted right of publicity statutes to protect the misappropriation of
an individual’s image.15 Using a player’s number on the jersey of his
corresponding school is arguably a misappropriation in itself. Moreover, the student-athletes’ claims are even stronger if the NCAA and
its members have purchased the keywords to make the jerseys
searchable by the players’ names on their websites.
Despite the unauthorized use of these athletes’ likenesses, the
argument remains that student-athletes receive sufficient compensation through academic scholarships. One proponent of this argument
is Sports Illustrated writer Seth Davis, who stated, “[s]tudent-athletes
earn free tuition, which over the course of four years can exceed
$200,000.”16 Although this is a valid argument, that compensation
does not seem adequate in comparison to the billions of dollars the
NCAA generates. Student-athletes, on average, spend approximately
eighty hours per week performing their athletic and academic responsibilities.17 Thus, student-athletes do not have much time to receive
compensation through employment opportunities. Regardless of student-athletes’ inability to obtain part-time jobs, the NCAA places
strict regulations on outside employment that, which limits the
amount of money a college athlete may receive.18 Nevertheless, the
strongest argument for college athletes is that their scholarship can be
rescinded at any time, without cause.19
14

Id.
Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (“According to the Restatement [(Second) of Torts (1977)], [o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the
name or likeness of another is subject to liability”) (internal quotations omitted). The right
of publicity was enacted in order “to protect the property interest that an individual gains and
enjoys in his identity through his labor and effort.” Id.
16
Levin, supra note 5.
17
RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, THE $6 BILLION HEIST: ROBBING COLLEGE
ATHLETES UNDER THE GUISE OF AMATEURISM 9 (2012), available at
http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/pdfs/6-Billion-Heist-Study_Full.pdf (providing that in a round
table discussion with Congress, NBA basketball player, Shane Battier, stated that college
athletics are more demanding than professional athletics).
18
Kathryn Young, Deconstructing the Façade of Amateurism: Antitrust and Intellectual
Property Arguments in Favor of Compensating Athletes, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 338,
353 (2013).
19
Levin, supra note 5.
15
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This Comment addresses whether the NCAA may restrict the
use of student-athletes’ likenesses under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, which prohibits unreasonable restraints on trade.20 Edward
O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball player, is currently litigating
this issue.21 The NCAA has been subject to antitrust scrutiny for a
variety of reasons,22 but an unfavorable decision regarding studentathlete compensation may have a lasting effect on the landscape of
the NCAA.
As case law indicates, the NCAA’s role as a regulatory body
acts as a shield from antitrust liability.23 The NCAA has the responsibility of preserving the amateur status of its athletes, which justifies
many of its regulations that restrict competition.24 However, as the
NCAA’s economic power grows, restraints on student-athletes appear
increasingly unreasonable. By amending its bylaws, the NCAA
could reward student-athletes for their contributions to intercollegiate
athletics. Furthermore, the NCAA would not harm its fundamental
principle of amateurism if restrictions were placed on the amount a
student-athlete could receive for the use of his or her image. If the
maximum amount a student-athlete could earn does not exceed the
costs associated with attending the institution, amateurism would not
be harmed because the compensation would still relate to an educa-

20

NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984).
O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
22
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88 (alleging that the NCAA’s restriction on televised football games was an antitrust violation); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1998)
(alleging that the NCAA’s eligibility regulations, which prohibited a student-athlete from
competing while enrolled in a graduate program were an antitrust violation); Law v. NCAA,
134 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir. 1998) (alleging that the NCAA’s restriction on college basketball coaches’ salaries was an antitrust violation).
23
Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983) (upholding the NCAA’s sanctions of the University of Arizona, the court reasoned that “it is clear that the NCAA is now
engaged in two distinct kinds of rulemaking activity. One type . . . is rooted in the NCAA’s
concern for protection of amateurism; the other type is increasingly accompanied by a discernable economic purpose”); Smith, 139 F.3d at 185 (holding that regulations that preserve
amateurism are non-commercial in nature); Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA,
317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (D. Pa. 2004) (relying on Smith, the court held that recruiting rules
were implemented to preserve amateurism and were exempt from antitrust scrutiny); Basset
v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (recruiting rules forbidding improper inducements and academic violations are non-commercial).
24
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02. The Court explained that the NCAA markets a
unique product because sports coupled with academic tradition make the product more popular. Id. The NCAA must play a vital role in preserving the amateur status of its players in
order for the product to remain available. Id.
21
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tional purpose.
In this Comment, Section II concentrates on the history of the
NCAA and its evolution as a regulatory body. Section III focuses on
how the courts interpret Section 1 of the Sherman Act in relation to
claims against the NCAA. When applying the Act, the courts must
choose whether to adopt a Rule of Reason or a per se analysis; this
section explains why a Rule of Reason analysis is more appropriate
in an action against the NCAA. Section IV examines the various antitrust claims that have been brought against the NCAA. The case
law illustrates obstacles that a claimant faces when bringing an action
against the NCAA. Section V provides an in-depth analysis of how
potential issues confronting the NCAA may be resolved pursuant to
antitrust principles, and how the NCAA may compensate studentathletes while preserving amateurism.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE NCAA

As Kay Hawes, a former NCAA employee, once wrote, the
NCAA’s “father was football and its mother was higher education.”25
Little did he know, the marriage would result in a dysfunctional relationship. The NCAA is a non-profit entity that acts as a regulator of
amateur athletics and works closely with its member universities to
promote excellence in athletics as well as academics.26 A background of the NCAA illuminates the issues that the institution faces
in the realm of antitrust litigation.
A.

Formation

Intercollegiate sports were born in 1852 when Harvard and
Yale competed in a rowing match.27 The need for an organized body
in intercollegiate athletics became apparent as other sports began to
emerge and the lack of formal regulations resulted in serious injuries
to players.28 The gruesome nature of football led to the decision of
many universities to discontinue the sport, but student groups ran the
programs that remained.29 These groups were not concerned with the
25
26
27
28
29

CROWLEY, supra note 6, at 7.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
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amateurism of student-athletes because they often hired non-students
to compete.30 Consequently, President Theodore Roosevelt summoned collegiate athletic leaders to two separate White House conferences in order to encourage the reform of intercollegiate athletics.31 In response to the White House meetings, in 1906, sixty-two
college institutions became members of the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association of the United States, which officially became the NCAA
in 1910.32
The NCAA established itself as a non-profit organization with
amateurism acting as the foundation.33 However, initially, the NCAA
did not have a significant administrative role.34 That authority was
entrusted to its member institutions to enforce the principles and rules
set out in NCAA bylaws.35 The need for NCAA authority grew in
the 1920s when the first college football game was broadcasted and
the first championship was held for track and field.36 As more
NCAA championships developed, additional rule committees were
necessary, which sparked the shift of authority from the member institutions to the NCAA.37
B.

Growth and Evolution of the NCAA

Membership grew progressively in the 1930s and 1940s, and
by the time the NCAA elected its first executive director, Walter
Byers, in 1951, nearly 400 institutions and conferences belonged to
the NCAA.38 As more institutions became involved and the nation’s
interest increased, concern developed regarding the athletic-eligibility
and amateurism of student-athletes.39 The exponential growth of the
NCAA resulted in substantial differences in size, ambition, and complexity among athletic programs, which required the NCAA to step in
as a regulatory body.40 However, the authority granted to the NCAA
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

CROWLEY, supra note 6, at 4.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 15.
Id.
CROWLEY, supra note 6, at 15.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
CROWLEY, supra note 6, at 37.
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has frequently attracted antitrust scrutiny.
As television emerged as the prominent broadcasting medium,
Byers believed it would have a negative effect on in-game attendance.41 In order to maintain attendance records, Byers implemented a
program that limited the total number of televised intercollegiate
football games.42 In 1985, the validity of Byers’s television plan was
the basis of the antitrust suit brought before the Supreme Court in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents.43 The
Court held that the restriction on televised sporting events had a significant anticompetitive effect among broadcasters in the market and,
therefore, was a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 44 The
Court reasoned “that by curtailing output and blunting the ability of
member institutions to respond to consumer preferences, the NCAA
has restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.”45 This decision has spurred competition
among broadcasters and has resulted in a dramatic increase in the
price for NCAA television rights.
At the time of Board of Regents, each broadcasting network
agreed to pay participating member institutions a minimum aggregate
compensation of $131,750,000 over a four-year period.46 Thirty
years later, television contracts with the NCAA and its member institutions have increased at a shocking rate. In 2010, the NCAA announced a 14-year, $10.8 billion contract with Turner Broadcasting
and CBS to televise the NCAA basketball tournament.47 Furthermore, the NCAA recently struck a deal with ESPN for its newly implemented playoff system that will replace the BCS Championship in
college football.48 The contract is a 12-year deal that will begin in the
2015-2016 season, and it will pay the NCAA approximately $470
million a year for the broadcast rights to only three games.49
41

Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
43
468 U.S. 85, 87 (1984).
44
Id. at 120.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 92-93.
47
Steve Berkowitz, Parts of NCAA’s TV contract with CBS, Turner go public, USA
TODAY (Oct. 16, 2012, 8:04 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2012/10/16/n
caa-tournament-turner-cbs-contract/1637179/.
48
Jerry Hinnen, ESPN reaches 12-year deal to air college football playoffs,
CBSSPORTS.COM (Nov. 21, 2012, 2:03 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eyeon-college-football/21083689/espn-reaches-12year-deal-to-air-college-football-playoffs.
49
Id.
42
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The economic growth of the NCAA is alarming because of its
impact on the activity of its member institutions. Currently, college
football is composed of eleven conferences and one group of independent schools.50 Recently, schools have left their conference when
a superior financial opportunity has presented itself.51 With their
economic wellbeing at stake, schools want to belong to a premier athletic conference, which generates the most television revenue.52 For
instance, Texas University, a member of the Big 12, a premier conference, formed its own television network with ESPN that will gross
approximately $15 million annually for the University.53 The Pac-12,
another conference with regional dominance, signed a 12-year, $3
billion contract with ESPN, which will be split among the members
of the conference.54 Syracuse University and the University of Pittsburgh, longtime members of the Big East, recently joined the Atlantic
Coast Conference in order to capitalize on the money available
through college football.55 Although conference realignment has
provided certain institutions with more economic flexibility, it has also eliminated longtime rivalries in basketball and football. This
opens up the question of whether the priority of the NCAA and its
member institutions is to preserve the wellbeing of amateur studentathletes or to benefit economically.
With regard to this issue, Edward O’Bannon, a former UCLA
basketball player, has brought a class-action antitrust suit against the
NCAA.56 The complaint alleges that the NCAA unreasonably restricted competition by fixing the players’ income at “zero” for the
use of their names and likenesses.57 Therefore, the plaintiffs contend
that student-athletes should have the right to pursue compensation for
the notoriety they have gained as result of their collegiate athletic ca-

50

Mike Bostock, Tracing the History of N.C.A.A. Conferences, NY TIMES, Nov. 30, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/11/30/football-conferences/ (providing a chart
that displays all of the massive changes that occurred recently to the NCAA’s conference
structure).
51
Thamel, supra note 3.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 2, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C 09-1967 CW) [hereinafter O’Bannon
Complaint].
57
O’Bannon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170, at *5.
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reers.58 The plaintiffs argue that the prohibition of this right is an unreasonable restraint on trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Electronic Arts Inc. (“EA”) and the Collegiate Licensing Company (“CLC”), which were also part of the lawsuit, recently
settled with the players, but the NCAA contends that it is willing to
continue litigating the issue.59
The NCAA’s defense is predicated on the fundamental principles enunciated in its bylaws.60 The NCAA stresses the importance
of its role as a regulator of amateur athletics and its duty to implement regulations to ensure its preservation.61 Therefore, the restrictions placed on student-athletes serve the purpose of maintaining
a clear distinction between professional and amateur athletics. 62 Despite the NCAA’s tenacity to continue litigation, an unfavorable verdict would have a profound effect on its future because it would be
required to share a percentage of its revenue with student-athletes.63
It is possible that a substantial portion of the NCAA’s collegiate licensing and television revenue could shift into the student-athletes’
hands.64 Changes have already begun to materialize as EA Sports
will no longer produce the NCAA College Football video game and
the NCAA will no longer sell players’ jerseys on its website.65 Until
this case reaches a resolution, the future relationship between the
NCAA and its student-athletes will remain uncertain.

58

Id.
Michael McCann, O’Bannon settles with EA and CLC, NCAA still remaining, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Sep. 26, 2013, 8:18 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/new
s/20130926/mccann-obannon-ea-clc-settlement/.
60
O’Bannon, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19170, at *3. The NCAA requires student-athletes to
sign Form 08-3a, which allows the NCAA to use players’ names to generally promote the
NCAA championship or other events. Id. A member institution or recognized entity may
also use an athlete’s name, picture, or appearance to support its charitable or educational activities, or to support activities considered incidental to the student-athlete participation in
intercollegiate athletics under bylaw Article 12.5.1.1. Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Steve Berkowitz, Judge lets class-action efforts in O’Bannon case go on, USA TODAY
(Jan. 30, 2013, 12:11 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/01/30/ncaaobannon-players-lawsuit-name-and-likeness/1877031/.
64
Id.
65
McCann, supra note 59; Terrance Harris, Ed O’Bannon Antitrust Lawsuit has Serious
Implication for Student-Athletes, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 30, 2012, 6:23 AM), http://www.no
la.com/tulane/index.ssf/2013/08/ed_obannon_antitrust_lawsuit_h.html.
59
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NCAA AND SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

The NCAA has virtually no competitors in the market of amateur athletics, which seems to violate the basic principles of the
Sherman Act. The legislative history delineates that Congress passed
the law to restrain mergers among competitors.66 Congress’s concern
was that these combinations could weaken competition in the market,
leaving the merged business with complete market power.67 However, the NCAA’s market is more ambiguous when analyzing an antitrust claim because it is an organization of members that compete
with one another. How the courts deal with distinct markets, such as
the NCAA’s, is addressed in this section.
In order to have a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) that there was a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained
trade under either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis; and (3) that the restraint affected interstate commerce.”68 Some
restraints on competition may be justifiable to achieve a specific purpose; therefore, the Act condemns “only unreasonable restraints of
trade.”69 This creates a challenge for student-athletes, who must establish that the NCAA bylaws they adhere to create an unreasonable
restraint on trade despite the NCAA’s justifiable reasons for enforcing them.
Although the restriction on student-athletes was not in controversy in Board of Regents, the Court stressed the importance of the
NCAA’s regulations and established a strong foundation for future
antitrust claimants.70 Justice Stevens, in dicta, expressed the importance of the NCAA’s task as a regulatory body to preserve the
amateur and academic status of student-athletes, as well as maintain
competitive balance among member institutions.71 The Court noted,
66

Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); see also Agnew v. NCAA, 683
F.3d 328, 334-35 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir.
1992) (“The purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect consumers from injury that results
from diminished competition.”)).
67
See id. (holding that not all monopolies are per se illegal). If the court believes that an
entity is justified in restricting competition, then it will analyze whether that restriction is
unreasonable. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
68
Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d at 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bhan
v. NME Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991)).
69
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98.
70
Id. at 101-02.
71
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss3/15

10

Grimmett: NCAA Amateurism and Athletics

2014]

NCAA AMATEURISM AND ATHLETICS

833

“[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of
the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams.”72 Therefore, most courts look at whether the
regulation has an effect on amateurism or fair competition when analyzing NCAA restraints on competition.
A.

Rule of Reason Analysis

Most courts adopt a Rule of Reason analysis in claims involving the NCAA because, as a regulator of amateur athletics, the
NCAA possesses justifiable means to restrict competition.73 A restraint on competition is unreasonable under a Rule of Reason analysis if “the restraint’s harm to competition outweighs its
procompetitive effects.”74 Therefore, the initial burden is on the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the restraint has an anticompetitive effect
within a “relevant market.”75 If the plaintiff can make a sufficient
showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a
procompetitive justification.76
If the plaintiff can establish a presumption of anticompetitive
conduct, the NCAA will most likely be able to rebut this presumption. As a non-profit entity, the NCAA’s purpose is to promote academics, amateurism, and competitive balance among student-athletes.
In Board of Regents, Justice Stevens noted the importance of the
NCAA’s role in preserving amateurism by stating, “[i]n order to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be
paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”77 Therefore, the
NCAA’s legitimate reason behind its regulatory measures acts as a
72

Id. at 117.
Id. (“Our decision not to apply a per se rule to this case rests in large part on our recognition that a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of competition that petitioner and its member institutions seek to market is to be preserved.”). The courts employ
both a per se rule and the Rule of Reason analysis to come to a consensus regarding the extent of a defendant’s anticompetitive conduct. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103. A per se rule
is employed when the surrounding circumstances demonstrate that the defendant’s anticompetitive conduct is so great that no further analysis is necessary. Id. at 103-04.
74
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. California, 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hairston,
101 F.3d at 1018).
75
Id. (citing Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988) (contending that in order to ascertain whether the proper relevant market has been established,
the court analyzes the geographic region where a consumer can turn to an alternate source
for the product)).
76
Id.
77
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102.
73
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shield against prospective antitrust violations.78
B.

Per Se Analysis

Courts will rarely apply a per se rule against the NCAA, unless there is no regulatory measure apparent.79 Courts apply a per se
rule when “the practice facially appears to be one that would always
or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”80
This analysis differs from a Rule of Reason analysis because a restraint is facially presumed unreasonable.81 As a non-profit entity,
the NCAA imposes a myriad of regulatory controls to administer its
ideals, creating a justifiable reason behind restricting competition.
Applying a per se rule against the NCAA would require its actions to
be facially unreasonable, which is unlikely because its regulations
serve the purpose of preserving amateur athletics.
If the NCAA were to lose its non-profit status, however, the
consequences would be devastating. It would open the floodgates to
antitrust litigation and require the courts to apply a per se standard
because there would be no purpose behind its regulations. In 2006,
Congress questioned the NCAA’s tax-exempt status as a non-profit
entity.82 The Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and
Means, Bill Thomas, sent a letter to the NCAA president expressing
concern with lucrative television contracts, the increase in coaches’
salaries, and the effect these practices have had on college athletics’
commitment to higher education.83 Thomas wrote that the activities
member institutions undertake as educational organizations clearly
reflect their tax-exempt status; however, “[t]he exempt purpose of intercollegiate athletics . . . is less apparent, particularly in the context
of major college football and men’s basketball programs.”84 The
NCAA still stands as a non-profit entity, but as its revenues continue
78

Id. at 117.
See id. (contending that the Supreme Court in Board of Regents reversed the Court of
Appeals’ decision because it employed a per se rule and found that a Rule of Reason analysis
was appropriate because most of the regulatory controls that the NCAA enforces are a justifiable means for hindering competition).
80
Id. at 100 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979)).
81
Id.
82
Steve Wieberg, NCAA’s tax-exempt status questioned, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2006, 2:40
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2006-10-04-ncaa-tax-status_x.htm.
83
Id.
84
Id.
79
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to rise at an exponential rate, Congress’s concern regarding its taxexempt status will only increase.
IV.

BARRIERS TO BRINGING A CLAIM UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT

When the NCAA acts in its regulatory capacity, it strengthens
its product and, therefore, enhances competition. Accordingly, the
major challenge an antitrust claimant faces is demonstrating that a
regulation is unreasonable when it serves the purpose of preserving
amateurism, promoting education, and maintaining competitive balance.85 Most courts follow the dichotomy enumerated in Board of
Regents, in which an unreasonable restraint on competition is
weighed against the NCAA’s fiduciary duty to its student-athletes.86
The Supreme Court expressed the importance of many of the
NCAA’s regulatory controls, which often shield the NCAA from antitrust scrutiny when it is acting in a regulatory manner.87 The Supreme Court, as well as many lower courts, suggest that an antitrust
violation has occurred if a regulation constrains, rather than enhances, intercollegiate athletics.88
The Supreme Court in Board of Regents was the first to address the issue inherent in applying an antitrust claim to a collegiate
sports organization. The Court reasoned that the NCAA places a horizontal restraint on trade because it consists of member institutions,
which agree on rules that restrict the way in which they compete
against one another. 89 Thus, in order to ascertain the reasonableness
85
See, e.g., Smith, 139 F.3d at 185; see, e.g., Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 383 (“Because the
sanctions evince no anticompetitive purpose, are reasonably related to the association’s central objectives, and are not overbroad, the NCAA’s action does not constitute an unreasonable restraint under the Sherman Act.”); see, e.g., Bassett, 528 F.3d at 433.
86
See, e.g., Smith, 139 F.3d at 187.
87
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
88
See, e.g., id. at 104 (“[T]he essential inquiry remains the same—whether or not the
challenged restraint enhances competition.”). The Court held that the NCAA’s regulation,
which limited the number of games that could be televised, violated the Sherman Act because it restricted, rather than enhanced, intercollegiate athletics for all of its viewers. Id. at
120; see also Smith, 139 F.3d at 187 (“the [eligibility] bylaw at issue here is a reasonable
restraint which furthers the NCAA’s goal of fair competition”). Because the challenged regulation enhanced intercollegiate athletics by ensuring fair competition, the bylaw survived
antitrust scrutiny. Id.; see also Basset, 528 F.3d at 433 (stating that recruiting regulations
that result in the sanctioning of member institutions are not an antitrust violation, because
they enhance intercollegiate athletics by ensuring fair competition).
89
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101 (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 278
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of the restriction, the Court must gauge the effect the restriction has
on the operation of a free market.90 This could prove to be challenging for an antitrust claimant because if substitute products are available, it will expand the contested market, making a restraint on trade
less likely.91 Nevertheless, the Court determined that college football
was the relevant market because of the effect the restriction had on
the operation of broadcasters.92 The Court found that college football
provides a unique product to advertisers and the horizontal restraint
placed on the product eliminated competition among broadcasters in
the market.93 This section addresses, in more detail, the specific challenges that exist when bringing a claim against the NCAA and how
these challenges can possibly be overcome.
A.

NCAA’s Pro-Competitive Justifications as a NonProfit Entity

Courts have consistently viewed the NCAA’s regulatory
powers as an axe against antitrust scrutiny, with the foundation established in Board of Regents acting as the handle.94 The NCAA markets a unique product, which must combine academics with athletics,
and the fragile nature of maintaining an association between the two
is the source of the NCAA’s power.95 Thus, courts consistently recognize the importance of regulatory measures taken in order to pre-

(1978) (noting that league sports require a unique analysis because they are a product that
can only be carried out jointly)).
90
Id. at 101 (“[W]hat the NCAA . . . market[s] . . . is competition itself—contest between
competing institutions . . . this would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on
which the competitors agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed.”). “By
participating in an association which prevents member institutions from competing against
each other . . . the NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal restraint—an
agreement among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another.” Id.
at 99.
91
See id. at 111 (stating that the NCAA argued that the relevant market was the entertainment industry). An expansive view of the relevant market would not restrict competition
among broadcasters because they would still be able to compete for all of the programs
available in the entertainment industry. Id.
92
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 111-13.
93
Id. at 111 (finding that the willingness to advertisers to pay more per viewer for college
football audience demonstrated how unique the product is).
94
Id. at 101-02 (“The identification of this ‘product’ with an academic tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than professional sports . . . . Thus,
the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve its character”).
95
Id.
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serve the integrity of the product.96
The NCAA’s paramount goal has been the preservation of
amateurism and regulations which achieve this goal have been uniformly upheld as procompetitive.97 The Third Circuit, in Smith v.
NCAA,98 expressed the importance of ensuring amateurism among
student athletes because of its effect on fair competition.99 In Smith,
a college volleyball player was denied her remaining two years of
athletic eligibility when she enrolled in a post-graduate program at a
different school than her undergraduate institution..100 The court held
that the NCAA’s regulation, which prohibited a student-athlete from
using his or her remaining athletic eligibility while enrolled in a different
school’s
post-graduate
program,
was
deemed
procompetitive.101 The rule furthers the NCAA’s goals of amateurism and fair competition by preventing a form of post-graduate recruiting where premier athletic institutions induce student-athletes to
withhold their athletic eligibility at their undergraduate institution.102
The NCAA’s regulatory powers are so strong that the court in
96

See Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303-04 (D. Mass. 1975) (alleging that an eligibility rule that disqualified a hockey player from participating in intercollegiate athletics was
an antitrust violation). The court found no antitrust violation and reasoned that “[t]he
N.C.A.A. eligibility rules were not designed to coerce students into staying away from intercollegiate athletics, but to implement the N.C.A.A. basic principles of amateurism, principles
which have been at the heart of the Association since its founding.” Id.; see also Justice, 577
F. Supp. at 362-63, 383 (challenging NCAA sanctions that excluded the University of Arizona from the television market and postseason competition). The sanctions were implemented due to a recruiting violation where football players were compensated for their play.
Id. The Court found no antitrust violation because the regulation was “rooted in the
NCAA’s concern for the protection of amateurism.” Id.; see also Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F.
Supp. 738, 740, 746 (D. Tenn. 1990) (challenging the NCAA’s rule which invalidates a
player’s eligibility when hiring an agent or entering a professional draft). The court held that
the “regulation by the NCAA in fact makes a better ‘product’ available by maintaining the
educational underpinnings of college football and preserving the stability and integrity of
college football programs.” Id.; see also McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding that the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules are procompetitive because they further the NCAA’s goal of integrating academics with athletics).
97
Id.
98
139 F.3d 180.
99
Id. at 187.
100
Id. at 183-84 (noting that the NCAA allows four years of athletic eligibility and Smith
was within all eligibility requirements at the time of the case).
101
Id. at 187 (“[T]he bylaw at issue here is a reasonable restraint which furthers the
NCAA’s goal of fair competition and the survival of intercollegiate athletics and is thus
procompetitive.”).
102
Id. The regulation also serves the purpose of preventing student-athletes from withholding eligibility on their own initiative in order to play at a better athletic institution when
they are older and have more experience. Smith, 139 F.3d at 187.
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Pocono Invitational Sports Camp v. NCAA103 held that a restriction
on an entity not even affiliated with the NCAA did not constitute an
antitrust violation.104 In Pocono, a top tier basketball camp alleged
that the NCAA placed an unreasonable restraint on competition by
requiring the camp to certify with the NCAA in order for Division I
coaches to visit.105 This clearly places a restriction on the camp because high school athletes will only sign up for the camp if it provides adequate recruiting opportunities.106 However, the court afforded deference to the fact the NCAA enacted this rule after its
studies suggested that non-institutional camps exploit campers in the
recruiting process.107 Thus, the court held that the restriction was
procompetitive because “when the NCAA promulgated these rules it
was acting in a paternalistic capacity to promote amateurism and education.”108
The courts are consistent in applying regulations on recruiting
and athletic eligibility.109 The Smith and Pocono decisions illustrate
the importance of NCAA intervention in these concerns because the
regulations ensure that member institutions do not receive an upper
hand when attempting to recruit players.110 Because of the concerns
103

317 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
Id. at 583-84. The NCAA’s regulatory power has also broadened as a result of the outcome in Pennsylvania v. NCAA. 948 F. Supp. 2d 416 (M.D. Pa. 2013). The dispute in
Pennsylvania arose out of the sanctions imposed on Penn State University for the highly
publicized scandal of Jerry Sandusky. Id. at 420. Sandusky, a former Penn State assistant
football coach, was convicted for the sexual abuse of children, which high-ranking Penn
State officials failed to report. Id. at 421. Despite the plaintiff’s argument that the sanctions
were not sufficiently tied to athletics, the court relied on Smith and held that the NCAA’s
regulatory power is not commercial in nature. Id. at 426-27. This is troublesome because
the regulations in Smith were enforced to preserve amateurism, and here they are to punish
criminal activity that did not involve student-athletes. Id. at 421; see also Smith, 139 F.3d at
185.
105
Pocono, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 571-73.
106
Id. at 575.
107
Id. at 583-84 (“The NCAA has provided substantial evidence in support of its position
that the rules were enacted to protect young players from being exploited.”).
108
Id. at 584. The NCAA provides in its constitution that it enacts recruiting regulations
“to promote equity among member institutions in their recruiting of prospects and to shield
them from undue pressures that may interfere with the . . . athletics interests of the prospects.” Id. at 572 (quoting NCAA Constitution, Article 2.11).
109
See supra note 96.
110
See, e.g., Smith, 139 F.3d at 185 (“Rather than intending to provide the NCAA with a
commercial advantage, the eligibility rules primarily seek to ensure fair competition in intercollegiate athletics.”); see, e.g., Pocono, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (“[T]he prohibition of gifts
and inducements, and the requirement that camp events not be financed by marketers, are
grounded in the paternalistic goal of separating high school athletics from the realm of pro104
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expressed in Board of Regents, it is unlikely a court will find an antitrust violation if the challenged regulation serves the purpose of enhancing intercollegiate athletics.111 Therefore, the NCAA’s responsibility for maintaining a clear distinction from professional athletics is
what stands in the way of student-athlete compensation.112
B.

Ability to Identify a “Relevant Market”

Another hill that an antitrust claimant must climb is establishing that the challenged NCAA regulation has an anticompetitive effect within a relevant market. As noted in Board of Regents, the nature of the NCAA creates a horizontal restraint on trade, which
requires the court to analyze the effect the contested regulation has on
the free market.113 Therefore, if the NCAA’s regulation is not commercial in nature, it cannot possibly affect the free market.
The plaintiff will most likely be deprived of the opportunity to
identify a relevant market when the NCAA regulation serves a noncommercial purpose.114 The Third Circuit in Smith held that eligibility rules are enacted in order to ensure fair competition and are not
related to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities.115 The
Sixth Circuit in Basset v. NCAA116 came to the same determination
regarding rules that sanction coaches for providing student-athletes
with improper inducements.117 The court held that regulations preventing the exploitation of student-athletes were non-commercial because their objective is to ensure competitiveness among member
schools.118 Therefore, if a regulation does not relate to the NCAA’s
commercial or business activities, it most likely falls outside the
fessional sports.”).
111
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
112
Id. at 101-02.
113
Id. at 113.
114
See Smith, 139 F.3d at 186-87 (“[T]he Sherman Act primarily was intended to prevent
unreasonable restraints in ‘business and commercial transactions,’ and therefore has only
limited applicability to organizations which have principally noncommercial objectives.”);
see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 343 (“Most-if not all-eligibility rules . . . fall comfortably within
the presumption of procompetitiveness.”).
115
Smith, 139 F.3d at 185.
116
528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008).
117
Id. at 433.
118
Id. (“Similar to the eligibility rules in Smith, NCAA’s rules on recruiting student athletes, specifically those rules prohibiting improper inducements and academic fraud, are all
explicitly non-commercial.”).
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scope of antitrust law.119
When there is a question as to whether the challenged regulation is commercial in nature, courts will adopt the “reasonable interchangeability” standard.120 This test was applied in Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA,121 and requires the court to
analyze whether there are substitute products in a specific market and
whether there is consumer sensitivity to the substitute products.122 In
Worldwide Basketball, the challenged regulation imposed a limitation
on the number of tournaments a basketball team can play within a
four-year period (Two in Four Rule).123 The court found that the
“reasonable interchangeability” standard was more appropriate than a
“quick look” rule of reason analysis, which is only applied when the
anticompetitive effect within a relevant market is readily apparent.124
Therefore, when the relevant market is neither obvious nor undisput-

119
See id. (holding that “[i]f the rules themselves and the corresponding sanctions are not
commercial[,] . . . then the enforcement of those rules cannot be commercial”); see also
Smith, 139 F.3d at 185 (holding that eligibility requirements are not subject to the Sherman
Act because they “are not related to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities.”);
Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746 (holding that eligibility rules are not subject to antitrust law);
Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 304 (holding that eligibility rules are not subject to antitrust law).
120
See Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 961 (6th Cir.
2004).
121
388 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2004).
122
Id. at 961. This inquiry establishes a relevant market because it demonstrates that the
challenged restriction has had an anticompetitive effect within a specific market. Id. The
plaintiff is required to display products that consumers may find interchangeable with the
product in dispute (i.e., professional football may be considered a substitute product of college football because both products broadcast the same sport). Id. If the court finds that
consumers will treat the substitute products in a similar fashion then they are considered
“reasonably interchangeable,” which establishes that competition still exists within the market. Id. Consumer sensitivity means that consumers will treat the products differently,
which increases the demand of the product and thus, eliminates competition in the market.
See Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 961. The court also noted that sub-markets may also
exist “by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket
as a separate economic entity.” Id. (quoting Brown Show Co., 370 U.S. at 325).
123
Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 957 (contending that the Two in Four Rule limits a
college basketball team from participating in more than one certified basketball tournament a
year and no more than two every four years).
124
Id. at 961 (contending that a quick look rule of reason analysis is appropriate when the
relevant market is readily apparent to permit the court to identify the market without any in
depth market analysis). The court did not believe that a restriction on the number of college
basketball tournaments a program could participate in qualified for a quick look rule of reason analysis. Id. at 961. The court will apply a quick look rule of reason analysis when “an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.” Id.
(quoting California Dental Assoc. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)).
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ed, the “reasonable interchangeability” standard will be applied.125
The Sixth Circuit’s application of the “reasonable interchangeability” standard was fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim because the
plaintiffs presented no evidence of any substitute products.126 The
plaintiff has the burden of presenting substitute products in order to
gauge the anticompetitive effects of the defendant’s conduct.127 If the
court finds that consumers will treat substitute products in the market
similarly, then the products are “reasonably interchangeable,” and
there has not been an unreasonable restraint on trade.128 Because the
plaintiffs did not advance any evidence of substitute products that
demonstrate consumer sensitivity, the court was required to dismiss
the plaintiffs’ claim.129 However, the court noted “that the Two in
Four rule has some commercial impact insofar as it regulates games
that constitute sources of revenue for both the member schools and
the [plaintiffs].”130 This establishes that although a rule may be enacted for a noncommercial purpose, the court may still find that the
rule has a commercial impact.131
Case law places a heavy burden on the plaintiff when identifying a relevant market.132 First, the challenged regulation must contain a commercial objective in order to fall within the subject matter
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.133 If the regulation is commercial,
then the plaintiff must identify substitute or identical products or services to gauge the regulation’s anticompetitive effect.134 This process
permits the court to apply the “reasonable interchangeability” test and
examine the substitute products to determine if the NCAA regulation
125
See id. (“Under the ‘quick-look’ approach, extensive market and cross-elasticity analysis is not necessarily required, but where . . . the precise product market is neither obvious
nor undisputed, the failure to account for market alternatives . . . will not suffice.”).
126
Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 963.
127
Id. at 961.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 963; see Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063 (noting that the failure to establish a relevant
market is a ground for dismissal).
130
Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 959.
131
Id. (“The dispositive inquiry in this regard is whether the rule itself is commercial, not
whether the entity promulgating the rule is commercial.”).
132
Id. at 963 (holding that the plaintiff was required to introduce evidence of substitute
products to gauge the anticompetitive effect in the relevant market); see also Smith, 139 F.3d
at 185-86 (recognizing that antitrust law has limited applicability to organizations with noncommercial objectives); see, e.g., Basset, 528 F.3d at 433 (“In order to state a claim under
the Sherman Act there must be a commercial activity implicated.”).
133
Smith, 139 F.3d at 185-86; see also Basset, 528 F.3d at 433.
134
Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 961.
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restrains trade in the market.135 Therefore, ascertaining the relevant
market is difficult because of the non-commercial objectives of the
NCAA and the plaintiff’s burden of establishing consumer sensitivity
to substitute products.
C.

Overcoming Antitrust Barriers

Not many antitrust claims against the NCAA have been successful since the ruling in Board of Regents.136 This is attributed to
the words of Justice Stevens, concerning the NCAA’s role of maintaining a distinct line between amateur and professional athletics.137
Because of the dicta in Board of Regents,138 it is apparent that claims
concerning eligibility and amateurism face a severe challenge. However, as the NCAA’s economic prowess increases, maintaining that
distinct line will become more difficult.
The NCAA’s economic success has increased coaches’ salaries, which was the basis of the dispute in Law v. NCAA.139 This suit
was initiated due to an NCAA regulation that placed a restriction on
coaches’ salaries.140 The NCAA argued that the rule was implemented in order to maintain competitiveness because schools were starting
to pay higher salaries for experienced coaches, which certain smaller
schools could not afford.141 However, the Tenth Circuit held that the
rule created an unreasonable restraint on trade and provided an interesting analysis that could be beneficial for future claimants.142
In Law, the court recognized that “[n]o ‘proof of market power’ is required where the very purpose and effect of a horizontal
agreement is to fix prices so as to make them unresponsive to a com-

135

Id.
See, e.g., Smith, 139 F.3d at 185 (holding that regulations that preserve amateurism are
non-commercial in nature); Pocono, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 584 (holding that the recruiting rules
were implemented to preserve amateurism and were exempt from antitrust scrutiny); Basset,
528 F.3d at 433 (holding that recruiting rules forbidding improper inducements and academic violations are non-commercial in nature); Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746 (holding that the
eligibility rules are not subject to antitrust law); McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345 (holding that
the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules are procompetitive because they further the
NCAA’s goal of integrating academics with athletics).
137
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102.
138
Id.
139
Law, 134 F.3d at 1012.
140
Id. at 1015.
141
Id. at 1014.
142
See generally id. at 1016-24.
136
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petitive marketplace.”143 The court held that the member schools’
agreement to restrict coaches’ salaries constituted a horizontal price
fixing agreement because the agreement eliminated market competition for assistant football coaches.144 The NCAA did not possess a
procompetitive justification because it failed to establish that restricting salaries would enhance competition, level the playing field, or reduce coaching inequities.145
The commercialization of the NCAA has provided studentathletes with more opportunities to obtain compensation through antitrust law.146 This is apparent in existing case law, as the regulation in
Law was invalidated because the coaches could not compete for
higher salaries that member institutions were willing to offer.147 Also, the court in Agnew v. NCAA148 noted that because member institutions compete to acquire athletes through “in-kind benefits,” such as
premier coaches with high salaries and top-tier athletic facilities, a
“labor market for student-athletes” would satisfy the plaintiffs’ burden of identifying a relevant market.149 Although the plaintiffs’ claim
involving the NCAA’s restriction that prohibited multi-year athletic
scholarships was dismissed for the failure to introduce evidence regarding a relevant market, the court recognized the commercial impact of regulations which place a restriction on student-athletes.150
Another case that dealt with a restriction on scholarships is
NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players’ Litigation,151 in which the
plaintiffs established Division I athletics as a possible relevant market
for student-athletes.152 The plaintiffs did not receive scholarships for
their participation in intercollegiate athletics and claimed that a limitation on the number of athletic scholarships provided was an antitrust violation.153 The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss
based on the plaintiffs’ allegation that Division I-A football was the
143

Id. at 1020.
Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
145
Id. at 1022.
146
Id. at 1012; see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 347.
147
Law, 134 F.3d at 1022.
148
683 F.3d 328.
149
Id. at 346-47 (“These are all part of the competitive market to attract student-athletes
whose athletic labor can result in many benefits for a college, including economic gain.”).
150
Id. at 347.
151
398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Wash. 2005).
152
Id. at 1150.
153
Id. at 1147.
144
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relevant market because of the absence of substitute markets in which
the plaintiffs could fully utilize their skills.154
The cases discussed in this section may provide studentathletes with a framework for overcoming the challenges of bringing
a claim against the NCAA. The decision in Walk-On Football Players may permit future claimants to assert Division I as a relevant
market because it is the only “viable option[] for student[-athletes]
wishing to make full use of their skills at the highest level of competition.”155 Furthermore, Agnew establishes a “labor market for student-athletes” and demonstrates the commercial nature of a regulation which restricts what college athletes may receive in exchange for
their athletic commitment.156 Additionally, the court found that
providing multi-year scholarships would not harm amateurism because “[i]t is not until payment above and beyond educational costs is
received that a player is considered a ‘paid athlete.’ ”157 Therefore,
student-athletes may be able to receive compensation as long as the
amount they receive is regulated to ensure that it is not in excess of
educational costs. Lastly, Law demonstrates that a horizontal agreement to fix prices is unlawful when no procompetitive justification
exists.158 Currently, the existence of a horizontal agreement to exclude college athletes from collegiate licensing may seem unreasonable when analyzing the size of the market.159
D.

Recent Litigation

Ed O’Bannon’s current lawsuit against the NCAA and its licensing affiliates could have serious implications for the future of the
NCAA.160 In the class action, antitrust suit, student-athletes seek the
right to use their names and likenesses in order to enter into licensing
agreements.161 However, “the (plaintiffs) are not advocating an end
to the principle of amateurism, nor are they advocating salaries.”162
154

Id. at 1150.
Id.
156
Agnew, 683 F.3d at 346-47.
157
Id. at 344.
158
Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
159
See generally O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56.
160
See McCann, supra note 59.
161
O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 2.
162
Steve Berkowitz, O’Bannon plaintiffs seek summary judgment against NCAA, USA
TODAY (Aug. 28, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/11/15
155
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The complaint alleges that the NCAA has fixed the price of studentathletes’ images at “zero” and conspired to boycott student-athletes in
the collegiate licensing market.163
The nature of O’Bannon’s claim is inherently comparable to a
right of publicity claim because it alleges the misuse of studentathletes’ likenesses.164
As a result, the court consolidated
O’Bannon’s action with a right of publicity claim asserted by former
Nebraska quarterback, Samuel Michael Keller.165 Keller’s claim is
similar to the claim asserted in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,166 in
which EA was found liable for misappropriating the use of a former
student-athlete’s image.167 Although Keller does not assert an antitrust claim, both his and O’Bannon’s claims provide a possible avenue for the compensation of student-athletes through collegiate licensing.
O’Bannon’s claim presents several key issues. First, compensating student-athletes poses a threat to amateurism. The Supreme
Court has already expressed this concern by stating that in order to
preserve amateurism, student-athletes must not be paid.168 Thus, the
plaintiffs must work around the words of the Supreme Court. The
second challenge the plaintiffs face is identifying a relevant market
because the NCAA has the non-commercial objective of preserving
amateurism. Courts may find that no relevant market exists because
the regulations that bar student-athletes from receiving compensation
are not commercial in nature. Potential means of addressing these issues are discussed in the next section.
The NCAA currently has its hands full, as another recently
filed complaint alleges that the NCAA violated Section 1 of the

/ncaa-ed-obannon-lawsuit-name-and-likeness-summary-judgement/3598497/.
163
O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 32.
164
See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 151 (holding that the right of publicity protects individuals’
property rights to their image).
165
Dennis Dodd, Keller lawsuit vs. gamer EA Sports, NCAA clears major hurdle,
CBSSPORTS.COM (July 31, 2013, 6:41 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer
/dennis-dodd/22954567/keller-lawsuit-vs-gamer-ea-sports-and-ncaa-clears-major-hurdle.
166
717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). The plaintiff was a quarterback for the University of
Rutgers and brought an action against EA, alleging a violation of the right of publicity for
the misappropriation of his likeness in a college football video game. Id. at 145. The court
held that EA violated Hart’s right of publicity because of the use of his recognizable features
in a game that involved the same activity. Id. at 169.
167
Id. at 170.
168
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102.
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Sherman Act by unreasonably capping athletic scholarships.169 This
class action was brought by former West Virginia running back,
Shawn Alston, claiming that the NCAA has capped scholarships at a
price much lower than the costs to attend an institution.170 In his
complaint, Alston alleges that during his collegiate career he had to
take out a loan to cover the actual cost of attendance.171 This claim is
similar to the one asserted in Agnew, which alleged that denying athletes multi-year scholarships constitutes an antitrust violation.172 Although the plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed for failure to produce sufficient evidence, Agnew may support Alston’s claim because the court
stated that “[t]he proper identification of a labor market for studentathletes . . . would meet the plaintiffs’ burden of describing a cognizable market.”173
The argument still remains whether the NCAA has exceeded
the scope of its authority by placing the specified economic restrictions on student-athletes. The recent antitrust suits attempt to
lessen the NCAA’s regulatory power which shield it from antitrust
scrutiny.
V.

ANTITRUST APPROACH TO STUDENT-ATHLETE
COMPENSATION

The thought of paying student-athletes will make the NCAA
and its members cringe because of the threat it poses to amateurism.
However, a larger concern is that compensation would deplete the
revenue of the NCAA and its member schools. Regardless of the
NCAA’s motive, an antitrust litigant must overcome the precedent
that protects the NCAA’s regulatory power of preserving amateur169

Martin Rickman, Former West Virginia player files lawsuit against the NCAA for capping scholarship value, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 5, 2014), http://college-football.si.com
/2014/03/05/ncaa-lawsuit-shawne-alston-antitrust/.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Agnew, 683 F.3d at 332. The plaintiffs in this action were injured during their participation in collegiate athletics and as a result did not receive a scholarship for their entire academic career. Id. at 347. The facts surrounding this dispute may suggest that a scholarship
is not adequate compensation for student-athletes.
173
Id. at 346-47. The court expressed that a restriction on scholarships can have an anticompetitive effect because schools engage in a competitive market to attract student-athletes.
Id. The labor market for student-athletes is competitive in nature because “the pay involves
in-kind benefits as opposed to cash.” Id. For instance, institutions compete for top-tier
coaches and invest a significant amount of money in its athletic facilities to obtain premier
athletes in order to benefit its athletic program. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 347.
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ism.174
Despite these concerns, compensating college athletes may
actually preserve amateurism more successfully than the strict regulations that are currently in effect. College athletes in dire need of financial assistance are often confronted with the temptation of accepting enticements to attend an institution or participate in point shaving
scandals.175 In order to enforce its regulations, the NCAA is mandated to investigate and penalize such activity.176 Consequently, the investigations that surface result in a negative conception of the NCAA
because they expose the public to the corruption and unfair practices
that exist in intercollegiate athletics.177 As the NCAA’s revenue continues to rise, student-athletes will assert a greater entitlement to
compensation and improper inducements will continue. Easing the
burden on student-athletes might deter this sort of illegal activity and
ensure fair competition among member institutions. This section explores how student-athletes can procure compensation through the
use of antitrust law and how the NCAA can monetize its product
without eliminating the fundamental principle of amateurism.
A.

The NCAA’s Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act

Existing precedent favors the NCAA.178 Nevertheless, the
NCAA has developed immense market power in the thirty years following the decision in Board of Regents.179 Thus, some power has
174
See Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 304 (holding that eligibility rules are procompetitive because they preserve amateurism); see also Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 383 (holding that recruiting rules are immune from antitrust scrutiny because they preserve amateurism); see also
Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746 (holding that an eligibility “regulation by the NCAA in fact
makes a better ‘product’ available by maintaining the educational underpinnings of college
football and preserving stability and integrity of college football programs.”); see also
McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345 (holding that the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules are
procompetitive because they further the NCAA’s goal of integrating academics with athletics).
175
See, e.g., Rob Dauster, FBI: San Diego point-shaving scandal netted ‘more than
$120,000, NBC SPORTS (May 22, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://collegebasketballtalk.nbcsports.co
m/2013/05/22/fbi-san-diegos-brandon-johnson-paid-up-to-10000-per-game-to-shave-points/
(stating that a former San Diego point guard was sentenced to six months in prison for his
role in a point shaving scandal during the 2009-2010 season when he received up to $10,000
a game); see, e.g., supra note 7.
176
Id.
177
See, e.g., Dauster, supra note 175.
178
See, supra note 174.
179
See, e.g,, Berkowitz, supra note 47; see, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 92-93 (stating
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swung in favor of the plaintiffs because it is unlikely that the
NCAA’s economic growth will go unnoticed when resolving an antitrust claim.
Although the largest portion of the NCAA’s revenue derives
from its television broadcasts,180 an attempt to receive a portion of
this revenue through antitrust law will most likely be futile. Because
it is the NCAA and member institutions that engage in broadcast contracts, student-athletes cannot allege that they are excluded from the
broadcasting market. This is analogous to professional sports, where
the professional organization and its members enter into broadcasting
contracts, and the revenue contributes to part of a professional athlete’s salary.181 If student-athletes were to receive a portion of the
NCAA’s television revenue, it would require them to receive a salary
on top of their scholarship, which would undoubtedly destroy amateurism.
Claims involving the use of student-athletes’ likenesses are
distinguishable because the NCAA has precluded individual studentathletes from pursuing compensation in a competitive marketplace
through the use of their images.182 Excluding student-athletes from
the market may influence courts to find that the prohibition on their
property rights unreasonable. However, if student-athletes receive
compensation, a detailed analysis is required to overcome the amateurism concerns associated with paying players.
The size of the market from which current and former student-athletes are excluded will contribute to the strength of a claim in
an action pursuing the rights to student-athletes’ images. For instance, IMG Worldwide, the owner of the CLC, states on its website
that it “manag[es] the licensing rights for nearly 200 leading institutions that represent more than $3 billion in retail sales and more than
75% share of the college licensing market.”183 Moreover, the use of a
student-athlete’s likeness can extend beyond the sale of jerseys and
apparel to the sale of game-footage to advertisers, classic games that
have been re-aired, and the sale of photographs and DVDs.184 The
that networks were able to negotiate directly with member schools for television rights for a
minimum aggregate compensation of $131,750,000 over a four-year period).
180
Berkowitz, supra note 47.
181
See Huma, supra note 17, at 11 (stating that NFL players are guaranteed to receive at
least 46.5% percent of the revenue generated by the league).
182
O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 2.
183
Id. at 7.
184
Id. at 15.
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NCAA has developed immense market power in collegiate licensing
because it has sole possession of student-athletes’ images in a market
with no competitors.
In an antitrust suit, which alleges an unreasonable restriction
on the use of names and likenesses of student-athletes, the plaintiff
will easily satisfy the first element.185 The existence of a contract is
obvious based upon the member schools’ agreement to adhere to the
bylaws, as well as the student-athletes’ requirement to sign Form 083a.186
Although the first element does not pose a threat to claimants
in an action against the NCAA, plaintiffs may also be able to demonstrate a conspiracy among the NCAA, CLC, and EA to satisfy this element. Form 08-3a incorporates NCAA bylaw 12.5.1.1.1, which
permits the NCAA to use the image of a “student-athlete to generally
promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or
programs.”187 This is overly broad language because “generally
promot[ing the] NCAA” may extend to any licensing deal because it
will generate consumer interest through the increased exposure of the
brand. This may establish a conspiracy because it provides the
NCAA and its affiliates, EA and CLC, with the power to control the
collegiate licensing market through deals that misappropriate athletes’ images.
The second element requires the plaintiff to demonstrate an
anticompetitive effect within a relevant market; therefore, the challenged regulation must first be commercial in nature.188 The courts in
Smith and Basset found no competitive effect on the market because
the challenged regulations did not relate to the NCAA’s commercial
or business activities.189 However, these regulations were purely regulatory measures to ensure fair competition, and the NCAA did not
receive any profit as a result of its enforcement of the regulations.190
185

See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1062 (noting that the first element requires “a contract, combination, or conspiracy”).
186
See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 3; see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335
(“There is no question that all NCAA member schools have agreed to abide by the Bylaws;
the first showing of an agreement or contract is therefore not at issue in this case.”).
187
O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 11.
188
Smith, 139 F.3d at 185-86.
189
Id. at 185; Basset, 528 F.3d at 433.
190
Smith, 139 F.3d at 185 (noting that the NCAA cannot profit from denying the plaintiff’s athletic eligibility); see also Basset, 528 F.3d at 433 (holding that rules preventing academic fraud are not commercial and the NCAA could not profit from the suspension of a
coach).
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The court in Agnew noted that “the Sherman Act applies to commercial transactions, and the modern definition of commerce includes
‘almost every activity from which [an] actor anticipates economic
gain.’ ”191 Because the NCAA may use a student-athlete’s likeness to
“generally promote [the] NCAA,” the regulation is commercial in nature.192 The NCAA can reasonably anticipate an economic gain as a
result of the restriction it places on student-athletes because it may
use their images for promotional purposes, which ultimately increases consumer interest in the product.
Because the regulation is commercial in nature, the plaintiff
must then demonstrate that it has an “anticompetitive effect” within a
“relevant market.”193 However, according to the court in Law, no
proof of market power is needed when a horizontal agreement to fix
prices makes a product unresponsive to competition.194 Form 08-3a
is a horizontal agreement because the member institutions, which
compete against one another, have essentially agreed to fix the price
of student-athletes’ images at zero.195
Pursuant to this agreement, college athletes relinquish the
right to the use of their likeness, which prohibits them from competing in the collegiate licensing market.196 In order for the plaintiff to
be relieved of its burden of identifying a relevant market, the court
must find that the agreement to fix student-athlete compensation similar to Law, where assistant coaches could not respond to competition
because their salaries were fixed at a maximum price.197 Because a
horizontal agreement exists that completely excludes student-athletes
from the market, the NCAA’s market power in the collegiate licensing market will most likely be presumed.198
Despite the horizontal agreement to fix prices, if the court
finds that the anticompetitive effect is not readily apparent because
licensing companies may still compete with one another it will apply
191

Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340 (quoting Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1260b, at
250 (2000)).
192
See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 11.
193
Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063.
194
Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
195
See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 3.
196
Id.
197
Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
198
See id. (noting that a horizontal agreement to fix prices requires the court to apply a
“quick look” rule of reason analysis where the plaintiff is not required to identify a relevant
market).
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the “reasonable interchangeability” test.199 Still, a claimant will most
likely be able to demonstrate consumer sensitivity to consumer products because, as mentioned in Board of Regents, the NCAA markets a
unique product that is distinct from all other products because it
combines athletics with academics.200 This uniqueness provides the
NCAA with market power in the collegiate licensing market because
no “reasonable interchangeability” exists that causes consumers to
differentiate intercollegiate athletics from other athletic products.201
Furthermore, Walk on Football Players Litigation recognizes that a
single product market may be sufficient when no substitute markets
exist,202 and the collegiate licensing market provides student-athletes
with the only viable option to utilize the use of their names and likenesses.
The greatest challenge that a plaintiff faces is demonstrating
an unreasonable restraint on trade that outweighs the NCAA’s
procompetitive justification of preserving amateurism.203 The plaintiff will be able establish an unreasonable restraint on trade due to the
complete market power that the NCAA possesses over the collegiate
licensing market. By fixing student-athletes’ images at zero, the
NCAA has retained complete control of its athletes’ likenesses, thus,
allowing it to exclude competition from the market. A restriction exists because a competitor must deal solely with the NCAA and its
member institutions, which possess ultimate control of the price and
output of the product. Litigating this issue will require the plaintiff to
introduce specific evidence regarding the profits attributable to the
NCAA’s control over the market and the effect of the lack of competition in the market.
The NCAA is justified in restricting competition because preserving amateurism is essential to maintain the integrity of its product.204 In order for the restriction on competition to outweigh the
199

Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 961.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02.
201
See Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 961 (noting that if the plaintiff introduced professional football as a football product the court would find that there is not “reasonable interchangeability” between the two products because of the NCAA’s uniqueness, which provides them with complete market power).
202
Walk on Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
203
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. Because the NCAA is justified in restricting
competition in order to preserve amateurism the courts will most likely conduct this inquiry
under a Rule of Reason analysis. Id. at 117.
204
Id. at 102.
200
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NCAA’s justification to curtail competition, a plaintiff must work
around the language of the Supreme Court in Board of Regents,
which noted that student-athletes should not be paid and that the
NCAA has the power to restrict competition if the regulation serves
the purpose of enhancing public interest in intercollegiate athletics.205
To overcome this language, a plaintiff must emphasize that the words
are mere dicta from nearly thirty years ago when the economic
growth of the NCAA could not be predicted. Although the NCAA’s
revenue has risen sharply in the last thirty years, paying athletes still
poses a threat to amateurism. If agents are involved in the process
and players are competing for compensation, the NCAA will morph
into a professional league.
Board of Regents established that the proper inquiry to determine if there has been an antitrust violation is to analyze whether the
challenged regulation enhances or restricts the NCAA.206 Although
ensuring amateurism enhances the product, not every NCAA regulation may promote this purpose.207 Permitting student-athletes to use
their own images does not necessarily destroy amateurism if the use
is strictly regulated.
The exclusion of student-athletes from the collegiate licensing
market also places an unreasonable restriction on intercollegiate
sports because of its negative effect on consumers. The NCAA owns
complete market power of collegiate licensing and has granted the
CLC 75% of the market, which prohibits competitors from entering
the market and providing an alternative service that may be more appealing to certain consumers.208 Thus, the NCAA’s market power
has harmed consumers because without competition in the market the
NCAA has complete control over prices and output, which precludes
collegiate licensing companies from conforming to consumer preferences. Additionally, consumers wish to support their favorite players, and prohibiting the use of student-athletes’ images prevents consumers from owning any apparel containing a specific studentathlete’s surname.
As the NCAA continues to grow economically, players may
believe the use of their images unjustly enriches the organization and

205
206
207
208

Id.
Id. at 120.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 7.
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their acceptance of improper inducements will persist.209 Allowing
student-athletes to pursue compensation in a regulated manner might
act as a deterrent because a penalty for receiving improper inducements would diminish the value of a student-athlete’s likeness.
An argument can also be made that the NCAA has tarnished
its image as a regulator of amateur athletics through the mistreatment
of its student-athletes. It is immediately apparent to an observer that
the NCAA’s revenue stream is completely dependent on its athletes.
Meanwhile, anyone who follows college sports is likely aware of the
billions of dollars that the NCAA receives for its broadcast rights. In
addition, the NCAA and its affiliates have sold products that misappropriate student-athletes’ images, such as NCAA football video
games, which contain all of the features of college players except for
their names.210 There has been widespread criticism of the NCAA’s
exploitation of its athletes and the failure to take any action recognizing student-athletes’ contribution will continue to tarnish the
NCAA’s reputation.211 For many student-athletes, intercollegiate athletics might be the only time that their image has any value, but Form
08-3a requires them to relinquish all rights to their names and likenesses.212 Although permitting student-athletes to pursue compensation through the use of their name and likenesses poses a threat to
amateurism, courts may find that the increase in the NCAA’s revenue
has exploited student-athletes and resulted in an adverse impact on
the nation’s view of the NCAA.
Former student-athletes are more likely to prevail under antitrust law. The NCAA does not possess any procompetitive justification for its horizontal agreement, which forces student-athletes to relinquish their rights to their images in perpetuity. Barring the use of
their likenesses, which they developed in college, does not serve the
purpose of ensuring amateurism or fair competition when they are no
longer subject to NCAA regulations. This is comparable to Law because former student-athletes are subject to a horizontal price fixing
agreement that makes their property rights unresponsive to competition.213 For instance, former Boston College football star Doug Flutie’s most memorable moment is a Hail Mary pass that was completed
209
210
211
212
213

See, e.g., Dauster, supra note 175.
See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 169.
See, e.g., Deitsch, supra note 12.
See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 3.
Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
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on the last play of the game to win the 1984 Orange Bowl. 214 Although Flutie no longer has any affiliation with the NCAA, he may
not be compensated for any playback of that video for which he is
best known.215 Thus, the perpetuity requirement under NCAA bylaws should not withstand an antitrust challenge because it unreasonably restrains former student-athletes from competing in the collegiate licensing market.
This section demonstrates that the NCAA’s economic success
may have detrimental effects to amateurism. If the courts believe that
the NCAA has tarnished amateurism through its own actions, they
will most likely find the NCAA’s justifications for restricting competition less persuasive. Thus, arguments that demonstrate how the
commercialization of the NCAA has hurt intercollegiate athletics will
benefit antitrust claimants. For instance, student-athletes’ propensity
to accept improper inducements and the exploitation of studentathletes in licensing agreements may contribute to destruction of the
NCAA’s appearance of amateurism. As a consequence of the
NCAA’s economic growth, change is imminent, and in order for student-athletes to be compensated, a plan must be implemented that
will not destroy amateurism.
B.

Solution to Compensating Student-Athletes
Without Destroying Amateurism

Prohibiting players from receiving compensation raises several fairness issues that provide insight into the controversy of whether
student-athletes are entitled to any benefits outside of a scholarship.
Several commentators have conducted a market analysis on the value
of NCAA athletes by comparing their worth to professional athletes.216 This analysis was first conducted by examining professional
leagues’ collective bargaining agreements, which provide that National Football League players must receive at least 46.5% of the revenue generated by the league.217 This percentage was applied to the
revenue reported by member institutions minus the cost of a scholar-

214

Rick Wienberg, 9: Doug Flutie’s Hail Mary beats Miami, 47-45, ESPN.COM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/espn25/story?page=moments/9.
215
See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 3 (stating that Form 08-3a relinquishes
student-athletes’ likenesses “in perpetuity”).
216
Huma, supra note 17, at 10.
217
Id. at 11.
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ship to assess the fair market value of college players.218 The study
illustrated that in 2011, Division I football players lost an average of
$456,612 over a four-year period.219
A “full-ride” scholarship coupled with the concern for amateurism does not justify the prohibition on student-athlete compensation. A “full ride” scholarship under NCAA bylaws “consists of tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related books.”220
However, this does not include other expenses that are related to attending the institution, such as transportation and school supplies.221
During the 2011-2012 season, these expenses for Division I football
players averaged $3,285.222 Allowing student-athletes to pursue
compensation to cover their out of pocket expenses would actually
provide them with a “full grant in aid” to attend the institution.223
Reform is necessary to bridge the gap between the NCAA’s
increasing revenue and college athletes’ stagnant position. The failure to accommodate its athletes can pose great threats to the NCAA,
as its not-for-profit status requires it to act in the best interests of its
student-athletes.224 While the status of college athletes remains stagnant, coaches’ salaries are increasing at a rate higher than corporate
executives,225 member institutions are developing athletic complexes
valued in the hundreds of millions,226 and television ratings are reaching the equivalent of those for professional sports.227 The failure to
218

Id.
Id. at 12.
220
Id. at 11.
221
Huma, supra note 17, at 11.
222
Id.
223
Id. The NCAA has attempted to bridge this gap by approving a plan that provides student-athletes with unlimited food. Zach Schonbrun, The N.C.A.A. Ensures Athletes Will Get
All They Can Eat, NYTIMES.COM (April 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/spo
rts/ncaa-ensures-athletes-will-get-all-they-can-eat.html. The plan was put into place shortly
after 2014 College Basketball Champion, Shabazz Napier, expressed his concerns “that he
sometimes went to bed starving because his money ran out or the three-meal allowance was
not enough to fuel his calorie-melting training.” Id.
224
Wieberg, supra note 82.
225
Huma, supra note 17, at 6.
226
Brian Bennett, Facilities arms races proves recession proof, ESPN.COM (June 14,
2012),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/8047787/college-football-facilitiesarms-race-proves-recession-proof (noting that Michigan University completed a $226 million dollar renovation of its stadium in 2010).
227
See, e.g., Dominick Patten, NCAA Championship Game Ratings Up 18% Over Last
Year, DEADLINE.COM (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.deadline.com/2013/04/ncaa-championshipratings-louisville-michigan-final/; see, e.g., Richard Sandomir, Game 7 of N.B.A. Finals
Draws High TV Ratings, NY TIMES, Jun. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/sp
219
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amend its bylaws can expose the NCAA to even more litigation and
put its not-for-profit status in jeopardy.
Providing college athletes with the right to their likenesses is
the best solution to this problem. Many states recognize that an individual’s likeness is a property right because the individual has developed the value of his or her image through hard work.228 This essentially means that the NCAA deprives its athletes of their own
property by requiring them to sign Form 08-3a, at a time when there
image is possibly at its highest point.
Lifting the restriction on student-athletes’ intellectual property
rights will not remove all of the issues confronting the NCAA.
Clearly, the biggest issue is maintaining amateurism in intercollegiate
athletics. To address this concern, the monetary incentives received
for the use of athletes’ images must be capped. The NCAA should
conduct a study to determine the out of pocket expenses of college
athletes that are associated with attending school. Therefore, amateurism will not be affected because the compensation will still be related to academic purposes. In addition, the NCAA is not violating
its own “no pay for play” policy because the players are receiving the
benefit of their own property rather than compensation from the
NCAA.
The thought of corporate advertisers dealing directly with student-athletes also poses a threat to amateurism. The NCAA bylaws
prohibit a player from consulting with an agent while the player still
has athletic eligibility.229 This results in a conflict because corporate
advertisers should not deal directly with individuals who do not have
expertise in negotiating contracts. Allowing agents to help negotiate
these contracts would not only violate NCAA regulations, but would
also harm amateurism because of the agents’ economic interest in the
professional careers of student-athletes. The NCAA can resolve this
conflict by acting as liaison for college athletes, which eliminates
student-athletes from pursuing professional representation.
Another major concern is that this policy will result in the
disparate treatment of student-athletes because sponsors will only pay
for top-tier athletes. To address this, student-athletes should receive a
percentage of any licensing deal by the NCAA, which incorporates
their likenesses or images. For example, a percentage of the revenue
orts/basketball/game-7-of-nba-finals-draws-high-tv-ratings.html?_r=0.
228
See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 151.
229
Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 740.
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that the NCAA receives in a video game deal with EA or through the
licensing of players’ jerseys should be pooled and distributed to student-athletes evenly in their respective sport. Therefore, every athlete will receive some sort of compensation, and the restriction on the
amount players may receive all but eliminates any disparity among
athletes. Moreover, the NCAA will be able to conform to consumer
preferences by entering into licensing deals without misappropriating
its athletes’ images.
In addition to the solutions proposed, the NCAA should allow
athletes who make more than the calculated out of pocket expenses to
be eligible to receive the excess amount of money after their collegiate career. This prevents the misappropriation of student-athletes’
likenesses if the NCAA engages in group licensing deals that result in
profits for college athletes in excess of the capped amount. The
NCAA may also require athletes to surrender all money left in escrow, as well as relinquish the rights to their likenesses for receiving
improper inducements. This can act as a strong deterrent on top of
the existing punishments that the NCAA already enforces because
athletes will not want to risk possible suspensions when they are already being compensated. Also, putting the money in escrow does
not pose a threat to amateurism because student-athletes will be compensated at the cessation of their amateur careers. However, there
must be a limitation on the amount college athletes may receive upon
the termination of their athletic eligibility. This will prevent a large
disparity in compensation among student-athletes and the overendorsement of marketable players.
The final issue which must be addressed is that the implemented restrictions proposed still constitute a horizontal agreement
that fix student-athletes’ prices. This horizontal agreement, however,
will survive antitrust scrutiny because of the NCAA’s procompetitive
justification of preserving amateurism. This is not an unreasonable
restraint on trade because student-athletes are being compensated
through reasonable means. Without restrictions, advertisers would
sign the most talented players to lucrative endorsement deals, which
would undoubtedly turn the NCAA into a professional league.
This proposal has advantages over other recommendations.
One idea, implemented for a brief time by the NCAA, provides college athletes with a stipend to cover out of pocket expenses.230 There
230

Young, supra note 18, at 352.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

35

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 [2014], Art. 15

858

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

are several issues that a stipend creates, which is possibly why the
idea was struck down in 2012.231 First, a stipend would clearly violate the NCAA’s no pay for play policy, which can be distinguished
from the proposed solution because it provides athletes with compensation through their own property rights. Second, Title IX requires
the equal treatment of men and women’s sports.232 This would require member institutions to provide extra funding for women’s athletic programs that do not generate the same revenue that men’s football and basketball generate.233 Although there will be a disparity
among men and women, the proposed solution confers intellectual
property rights on all students and does not discriminate between men
and women. Finally, if the NCAA implements a stipend it will still
be subject to antitrust scrutiny because a horizontal agreement to fix
athletes’ prices at zero will remain. This will become even more
problematic as the NCAA’s revenue in the collegiate licensing market continues to grow.
The suit brought by Alston, regarding the alleged restriction
on scholarship funds, also suggests a solution that will not harm amateurism because the amount student-athletes may receive only
equates to a full grant in aid.234 However, this creates many similar
issues because the excess money required for scholarships will come
out of the institutions budget rather than a third party’s pocket. An
institution will also be required to provide this inflated scholarship to
every athlete due to Title IX regulations. Ninety six percent of the
revenue that the NCAA receives is redistributed to its member institutions, and a method of compensation that cuts into this funding may
require schools to reduce other athletic programs that do not generate
revenue.
The student-athletes of Northwestern University have also
taken a unique approach in an attempt to profit from their fair market
value.235 The Northwestern athletes have filed to unionize with aspirations that the National Labor Relations Board will recognize them
as employee-athletes instead of student-athletes.236 If the players’ un231
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ionization attempt is upheld, then the players will be given the right
to bargain for benefits from the NCAA.237 However, the major concern associated with this attempt is that the NCAA will retain immense bargaining power. In a collective bargaining agreement, one
of the negotiation chips that the union holds is the ability to strike if it
believes it is being treated unfairly. If student-athletes wished to
strike, they would be required to forego their education.
In sum, the best reform that the NCAA can implement is allowing athletes to seek compensation through the use of their likenesses. However, the compensation that these athletes receive must
be limited in order to preserve amateurism. The most effective method is to prohibit student-athletes from receiving compensation that
exceeds the out of pocket expenses during their collegiate careers.
Any additional money should be put in escrow for athletes to receive
after they no longer have athletic eligibility. The excess amount must
also be limited to whatever the NCAA deems fit in order to prevent a
large disparity among student-athletes and ensure that certain institutions cannot become more marketable than others. Also, the NCAA
has a fiduciary duty to its student-athletes and should act as a liaison
to prevent the exploitation of its athletes. This proposed method will
result in the proportional compensation of athletes based on the revenue they generate for the NCAA and its member institutions. Student-athletes would no longer be deprived of their property and the
NCAA could continue its prominence as a regulator of amateur athletics.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Dollar signs are ruining a product that was initially created to
provide a safe outlet for young adults wishing to compete against one
another athletically. Instead of acting in the student-athletes’ best interests, member institutions have clearly become motivated by economic concerns. A prime example is Syracuse’s departure from the
Big East Conference to pursue a more lucrative economic opportunity in the Atlantic Coast Conference.238 Syracuse disregarded the tradition and rivalries it had developed over a 34 year period for a big237
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ger paycheck.239
Is it right to suspend Johnny Manziel, a former Heisman Trophy winner, for allegedly receiving compensation for his autograph,
while the NCAA generates revenue through the sale of his jersey?
Manziel worked hard for his signature to have value but may not
benefit from it in any way. Meanwhile, the NCAA is a not-for-profit
entity, exempt from taxes, but generates revenue from its athletes’
jerseys.240 It seems impossible for this issue to go unnoticed as the
disparity increases between the NCAA’s revenue and studentathletes’ compensation in the form of their scholarships. The NCAA
and its member institutions should reward athletes for their accomplishments while maintaining its foundational principles.
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